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Abstract
From 1976 to 1983, Argentina was ruled by a military dictatorship
that disappeared an estimated 30,000 suspected subversives, including par-
ents of young children and pregnant women. Their children, either disap-
peared along with their parents or born in clandestine detention centers,
were then taken from their parents and adopted, often by couples who were
sympathetic with the government and knew of the children's origins.
This Article addresses Argentina's newest effort to identify these now-
adult children: compulsory DNA testing in cases where the raising parents
are suspected of having knowingly adopted their children illegally. It
argues that, although the mandatory testing permissibly infringes on the
adult child's right to privacy in favor of the biological grandparents' right to
truth, better options satisfy the interests of both groups. It offers a frame-
work for countries in conflict or transition that, in the future, may face a
similar dilemma-the apparent need to identify an innocent person's bio-
logical origins amidst that individual's reluctance or refusal to submit vol-
untarily to DNA testing.
Introduction
In May 2010, police in Buenos Aires, Argentina, raided the family
home of adopted siblings Marcela and Felipe Noble Herrera to search for
and seize personal items, including underwear and toothbrushes, for DNA
testing.' Such searches are not uncommon in the criminal justice system,
except that, in this case, the police suspected neither sibling of committing
a crime. 2 Instead, their mother, Ernestina Herrera de Noble, was the focus
of police efforts; they suspected her of illegally adopting her children dur-
ing Argentina's military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, when an esti-
mated 500 children were born in clandestine detention centers.3 Mrs.
Herrera de Noble is the largest shareholder in Grupo Clarin, the company
that controls Argentina's largest newspaper, among other media outlets.4
Her children, now in their thirties, have no interest in knowing their biolog-
ical origins, especially if doing so would implicate their mother.5 They have
refused to submit DNA samples to a court-approved laboratory, resulting in
the court-ordered raid of their home in May. In December 2010, the Noble
Herrera siblings were ordered to present themselves before the National
1. Andres D'Alessandro & Chris Kraul, Argentina Using DNA in 'Dirty War' Probe;
Siblings Targeted in National Effort to Locate Orphans, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2010, at C26.
2. Id.
3. Andres D'Alessandro & Chris Kraul, Argentina Tries to Uncover 'Dirty War'
Orphans, L.A. TIMEs, June 9, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/09/
world/la-fg-argentina-heirs-20100609.
4. Sam Ferguson, Children of Argentina Media Magnate Forced to Undergo DNA Test-
ing, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, June 7, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Americas/2010/0607/Children-of-Argentina-media-magnate-forced-to-undergo-
DNA-testing.
5. Editorial, Intruding on the Lost, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), June 12, 2010, at A24. Ms.
Herrera de Noble's husband died before the children were adopted.
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Genetic Databank for additional testing, "with or without their consent."6
This most recent court order is a result of a law passed in November
2009, 7 amending the criminal procedure code to allow courts to obtain
DNA samples from anyone who might be considered the child of a
desaparecido, one of the estimated 30,000 people disappeared by the gov-
ernment during the dictatorship. 8 The law was seen as an important vic-
tory for the members of the NGO "Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo"
(Abuelas), who have dedicated themselves to finding the children of the
disappeared. 9 These cases are part of the Argentine government's attempt
to hold the perpetrators of the atrocities committed during the dictatorship
responsible. As a result of the new legislation, many of the people who
devised the appropriation and illegal adoption scheme, as well as the par-
ents who adopted the children knowing the circumstances under which
they became available for adoption, are now facing charges in Argentine
courts.10
Not everyone is applauding the new legislation, however.1 ' While
some adult children willingly undergo DNA tests to determine whether
their biological parents were among the disappeared, others have no inter-
est in such identification. 12 For these adult children, taking a DNA test
betrays the parents who raised them.
Proponents of the law argue that it will help find the roughly 400
remaining people stolen as babies, while opponents see it as an invasion of
privacy and an impermissible government intrusion.13 The law clearly
implicates both the right to privacy and the right to truth. 14 This Article
considers whether the DNA law adequately protects both rights, and, if not,
whether there are other solutions that could better satisfy both the Abuelas
6. La Justicia cit6 a los hermanos Noble a dar nuevas muestras de sangre y saliva para
determinar su ADN, LA NAC1ON (Arg.), Dec. 21, 2010, available at http://www.lanacion.
com.ar/1335524-la-justicia-cito-a-los-hermanos-noble-a-dar-nuevas-muestras-de-sangre-
y-saliva-para-determinar-su-adn (author's translation).
7. Law No. 26.549, Nov. 26, 2009 (Arg.) [hereinafter DNA law].
8. See Antonio Castillo, "Justice Came Late, but it Came," INSIDE STORY, July 5, 2010,
http://inside.org.au/justice-came-late-but-it-came/; see also Jamie O'Connell, Gambling
With the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46
HARV. INT'L L. J. 295, 296 (2005).
9. See Castillo, supra note 8.
10. See id.
11. See generally Vicky Gashe, Truth vs. Right to Privacy: The Battle of the Abuelas, THE
ARG. INDEP. (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/socialissues/human
rights/truth-vs-right-to-privacythebattle-of-the-abuelas-/
12. In this article, the term "raising parents" will be used to denote the parents who
are suspected of raising children whose biological parents were disappeared. The term
"adult children" will be used in reference to these children, who are obviously no longer
children in the legal sense, but who are still the children of their raising parents, and the
grandchildren of their biological grandparents.
13. See Argentina Forces DNA Tests in 'Dirty War' Cases: Law Requires Suspected
Orphans Be Tested, Whether They Want To or Not, AssoCIATED PRESS, available at www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/34071255/nd/worldnews-americas/ [hereinafter Associated Press
article].
14. As discussed infra Part IV, the right to truth involves the right of society and
individuals to know the whereabouts and the fate of the disappeared.
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and the adult children who do not want their DNA tested. Furthermore,
this Article examines the effect of the Argentine DNA law in the context of
international human rights; that is, the obligations that states have to their
citizens. 15
Although much is written about individual human rights, the scholar-
ship lacks a discussion about how to proceed when the exercise of one
right precludes the exercise of another. I argue that because international
human rights law on this issue is inconclusive-both in terms of case law
and statutory interpretation-international law permits Argentina to legis-
late in this murky area; therefore, the DNA law is valid. But.1 also argue that
there are ways to achieve a better outcome that respects both the right to
privacy and the right to truth. While there is no solution where everyone
wins-where both the Abuelas and the adult children can fully exercise
their rights-there are solutions that maximize satisfaction with the
outcome.
By enacting the DNA law, Argentina adopted an accountability
approach to the issue of the disappeared children. This approach is consis-
tent with the focus in transitional justice over the past twenty or so years,
which has been on the prosecution of perpetrators of human rights
abuses. 16 With the establishment of modern international criminal tribu-
nals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Court,
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, mechanisms such as truth commis-
sions or lustration have fallen out of favor, or have at least taken a back
seat to criminal prosecution.
In the Argentine situation, however, other forms of accountability may
better serve the goals of both the Abuelas and the adult children who want
to shield their privacy. In the event that the Argentine government discov-
ers that the raising parents of a child of the disappeared were aware of their
child's origins, imposing substitute criminal charges' 7 would help allevi-
15. It should be noted at the outset that this article is using, as a starting point, an
example of conflicting rights in a rather unique context. Argentina's attempt to reconcile
these two rights in the context of identifying adult children who were stolen thirty years
ago and given to other families presents a number of issues that, while important, are
outside the scope of the article. I focus on privacy and truth, though there are certainly
arguments to be made about the right to identity in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the right to bodily integrity, family law, and the best interests of the child stan-
dard. See Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 8, 19, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S
3 (entered into force Sept. 2 1990) [hereinafter CRC]; see also International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights arts. 7, 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; [European] Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 (entered
into force Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998 respectively)
[hereinafter European Convention].
16. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda) 2005 L.CJ. 168 (Dec. 19, 2005).
17. As will be discussed infra Part V, substitute criminal charges involve charging a
person with a lesser crime than what he or she could be charged with or is suspected of
having committed. For example, this practice occurs in U.S. courts when prosecutors
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ate, from a judicial standpoint, some of the concerns the adult children
have about the effects of DNA test results on their raising parents. At the
same time, the Abuelas would be able to identify more children of the dis-
appeared. An even better option, however, is to place the burden on the
raising parents to come forward, and to provide a full accounting of how
their adopted children came into their lives. The Argentine government
could offer amnesty to raising parents who come forward, thereby meeting
the twin goals of discovering the truth and preserving the privacy of the
adult children. 18 Neither option, it must be noted, is completely satisfac-
tory to the adult children who want to remain in the dark, but if the Argen-
tine government is determined to proceed with efforts to identify children
of the disappeared, these alternatives are superior to the government's cur-
rent efforts and better protect the privacy interests of the adult children.
From the Argentine experience, we can construct a framework for gov-
ernment leaders who find themselves in a situation where using DNA evi-
dence to ascertain the biological origins of innocent people appears
necessary to further a legitimate interest-in this case, truth and accounta-
bility. This framework suggests that balancing certain factors, such as the
age of the individuals targeted for identification and the country's capacity
to house and test the DNA, will offer guidance on whether compulsory
DNA testing is the best way, or even a necessary way, to achieve the state's
goals. Such a framework will be useful, for example, in the aftermath of a
conflict in which rape was a common tactic, and the country wants to iden-
tify children born of rape, perhaps as a way to strengthen charges against
members of the military or rebel groups.
The first part of this Article provides a brief overview of the context in
which the DNA law was passed. It offers some background on the conflict
in Argentina and the dictatorship's plan to place children of the disap-
peared with families sympathetic to the government. Part I then focuses on
the work of the Abuelas, and discusses the development of the National
Genetic Databank and the details of the DNA law.
Part I frames both this seemingly unique example and the larger issue
of the clash of rights in a wider context. It posits that the Argentine situa-
tion is not as rare as it appears, and that the steps Argentina takes to
address the atrocities of its past are scrutinized by the international com-
munity as it also grapples with issues of post-conflict justice. Part III exam-
ines the human right to privacy, including permissible limitations. Part IV
considers the recently established right to truth and how it has been
invoked in the past.
charge a suspected Mafioso with money laundering and not murder, or when prosecu-
tors charge a suspect with a lesser offense in return for his or her testimony against
another suspect.
18. Of course, a grant of amnesty sacrifices the government's goal of criminal
enforcement. In many cases, however, the raising parents suspected of having illegally
adopted children are also suspected of other crimes connected to the military dictator-
ship. In the event that illegal adoption is the only charge at issue, the government will
need to determine if the goal of criminal enforcement trumps the goal of truth.
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Finally, Part V addresses the main issue of this article: what does inter-
national human rights law say about the rights in conflict? This Part argues
that the validity of the DNA law under international human rights law is
unclear, and thus, that under established international law, Argentina is
free to legislate in this area. This part also contends that despite the validity
of Argentina's approach, there are better solutions to the problem of trying
to identify the biological origins of adult children who do not want to par-
ticipate in this inquiry. Through either the imposition of substitute crimi-
nal charges for guilty raising parents or the issuance of amnesty in return
for the truth, the interests of the biological families and the adult children
can be better served. In addition, this Part offers a framework that leaders
in other countries in similar situations may use to assess the options availa-
ble to them when making the tough decisions about truth and privacy in
the context of transitional justice.
I. Compulsory DNA Testing in the Argentine Context
The passage of the Argentine DNA law in November 2009 is the latest
attempt by the government to punish the perpetrators of the many atroci-
ties committed by the junta in the 1970s and 1980s. To understand why
the law was proposed, it is first necessary to place it in a historical context.
In response to the disappearances that occurred during the dictatorship,
various groups began to seek answers regarding the whereabouts of their
children and grandchildren. 19 The Abuelas were one such group, and they
remain committed to identifying their missing grandchildren who were
either born in clandestine detention centers to disappeared parents, or
already born and then disappeared along with their parents. 20 It was the
Abuelas who pushed for the establishment of a genetic database to store
DNA from people whose identity was uncertain. 2 1 DNA testing then
became evidence used in trials of people suspected of illegally adopting
their children.22 To resolve inconsistencies among courts about the propri-
ety of ordering DNA tests, the law approving compulsory DNA testing was
passed in November 2009.
A. The Process of National Reorganization, 1976 to 1983
Following a period of violence in the 1970s, the military junta came to
power with popular support and ruled Argentina with a reign of terror
from 1976 to 1983.23 The country was initially hopeful that the military
would be able to restore the rule of law and bring peace to the society. 24
19. See Castillo, supra note 8.
20. See id. Certainly there are others who are interested in locating the children of
the disappeared, but the Abuelas are the most widely known and active group.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Jose Sebastian Elias, Constitutional Changes, Transitional Justice, and Legitimacy:
The Life and Death of Argentina's "Amnesty" Laws, 31 HASTINGS INT'I & CoMP. L. REV.
587, 591-92 (2008).
24. See id.
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Instead, the junta immediately began its Process of National Reorganiza-
tion (El Proceso). 25 In El Proceso, the dictatorship targeted "not only per-
sons espousing leftist subversion, but anyone suspected of opposing the
military regime, including priests, union workers, teachers, lawyers, psy-
chologists, journalists, and students. '26 Government agents embarked on a
campaign of terror, disappearing thousands of people, most of whom were
never seen again.27 These alleged "subversives" were taken from their
homes, their places of work, or off the street, often in broad daylight,
brought to one of the dictatorship's many clandestine detention centers,
and tortured relentlessly. 28 Estimates of the number of people disappeared
by the dictatorship reach as high as 30,000.29 The crimes committed dur-
ing what became known as the Dirty War included forced disappear-
ance,30 torture, murder, kidnapping, and the illegal adoption of children.
3 1
In 1982, facing growing pressure to curtail the widespread human rights
abuses, the junta mounted one last effort to retain power, and launched a
war to reclaim the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. 32 The Argentine mili-
tary was quickly defeated, left in a weakened condition, and forced to
accept the inevitability of democratic elections. 3 3
25. See id.
26. Terence S. Coonan, Rescuing History: Legal and Theological Reflections on the Task
of Making Former Torturers Accountable, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 512, 517 (1996).
27. The number of people disappeared by the military dictatorship remains in ques-
tion. Official government estimates hover around 9,000, although human rights groups
believe the number to be much higher, at approximately 30,000. SeeJo M. Pasqualucci,
The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INT' L.J. 321, 327 (1994) (giving the estimate
at 9,000); see also Christopher J. Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: Les-
sons from Post-Menem Argentina, 14 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 89, 100 (2007) (providing an
estimate of 30,000 by human rights groups).
28. See generally COMISION NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICION DE PERSONAS [NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS], NUNCA MAS [NEVER AGAIN]: REPORT OF
CONADEP (1984), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20030803004404/nunca
mas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain-000.htm [hereinafter NUNCA MAS].
29. See O'Connell, supra note 8, at 296.
30. Based on Argentina's Dirty War and similar tactics used by other South Ameri-
can governments in the 1970s and 1980s, the Organization of American States codified
a prohibition on forced disappearances in the Inter-American Convention on Forced Dis-
appearance of Persons, which entered into force in March 1996. See Organization of
American States, Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, June
9, 1994, 33 l.L.M. 1529 (entered into force Mar. 28, 1996). Current signatories include
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. In addition, a
1992 United Nations General Assembly declaration stated that no state may "practice,
permit, or tolerate" forced disappearances. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/47/49(I), art. 2(1) (1992). The principle of legality prevents Argentina from
charging suspects from the time of the dictatorship with the crime of enforced disap-
pearance, as the Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure did not include this crime until
well after the dictatorship ended.
31. Castillo, supra note 8.
32. See Elias, supra note 23, at 592; see also David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa
Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of International Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argen-
tina, 1976-1983, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1991).
33. See Weissbrodt & Bartolomei, supra note 32, at 1031-32.
Cornell International Law Journal
One of the more chilling aspects of El Proceso was the organized way
in which the junta kidnapped children-either babies born in the detention
centers' "maternity wards"'34 or young children whose parents were disap-
peared-and gave them to couples sympathetic with the regime, or even to
the very military or police officers who participated in the torture and kill-
ing of the children's parents. 35 These families either falsified identification
papers to indicate that the children were born to them, or registered illegal
adoption papers. 36 Moreover, when allegations of kidnapping and illegal
adoption came to light, some parents fled Argentina with their children in
what are known as "second disappearances. '3 7 The theft and distribution
of the children of the disappeared became known as "war booty" (botin de
guerra).38 It was this climate of brutal repression and secrecy that gave rise
to the formation of groups like the Abuelas.
B. Activism Amid Atrocity
Despite the horrors of the military dictatorship, there were people
questioning the regime and its practices from the start. Perhaps the most
well-known activist group, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Madres),
began marching in front of the Argentine president's house in 1977 to
demand information about the whereabouts of their disappeared chil-
dren.39 Their constant presence-they still march every Thursday-put
pressure on the government to make public the secrecy of its actions.
4 0
In 1977, an offshoot of the Madres, the Abuelas formed to focus not
on the disappeared children, but on the "living disappeared"-the Abuelas'
grandchildren who were taken along with their parents or were born to
pregnant women disappeared by the regime.4 1 The Abuelas "were not moti-
vated by revenge but by a desire simply to know that their grandchildren
were alive and well."' 42 They received denunciations from people believing
that a family member was among the children of the disappeared, appealed
to international media, and scoured birth certificates and adoption records
for any information that could lead to the identification of their
grandchildren. 4 3
34. Three percent of the women who were disappeared by the military dictatorship
were pregnant at the time they were disappeared. NUNCA MAS, supra note 28. The most
notorious detention center, the Navy School of Mechanics (ESMA), had a maternity
ward where prisoners gave birth and then were killed. See id.
35. See Laura Oren, Righting Child Custody Wrongs: The Children of the "Disappeared"
in Argentina, 14 HAv. HUM. RTs. J. 123, 123 (2001).
36. See id. at 128.
37. See Lisa Avery, A Return to Life: The Right to Identity and the Right to Identify
Argentina's "Living Disappeared", 27 H~Av. WOMEN'S L.J. 235, 259 (2004).
38. See Oren, supra note 35, at 128.
39. See History of Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, ABUELAS DE PLAZA DE MAYO, http://www.
abuelas.org.ar/english/history.htm (last visited May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Abuelas de
Plaza de Mayo].
40. See id.; see also Avery, supra note 37, at 247-48.
41. See Avery, supra note 37, at 247.
42. Id.
43. See id.
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The Abuelas' work paid off. In 1980, they located the first two children
stolen by the dictatorship and given to a military family.44 Moreover, after
the dictatorship ended and Argentina returned to a civilian government,
the Abuelas were able to pressure the government into supporting their
search.45 In 1992, the Interior Ministry established the Commission on the
Right to Identity (CONADI), which centralized efforts to locate the missing
children, and had both investigatory and prosecutorial powers.4 6 The
Abuelas' goal was to restore the children's identities and return them to
their biological families. The Abuelas felt they "owe[d] that to [their] chil-
dren, to find their children and tell them who their parents were . . . that
they were good, life-loving young people like them who died for a
principle. ' '47
C. The National Bank of Genetic Data and DNA in the Courtroom
In 1987, just four years into the new civilian government, the Argen-
tine Congress established the National Bank of Genetic Data, due in large
part to the work of the Abuelas and advances in identification science and
technology. 4 8 It was the first genetic database of its kind, and it offered its
services free of charge to anyone whose identity was at issue and to rela-
tives of the disappeared. 49 It was created to house genetic data and to pro-
duce reports and expert opinions. Family members of the disappeared,
including children who suspected that their parents had been disappeared,
could submit DNA.
50
In August 2009, a mere three months before the Argentine Senate
passed the law permitting compulsory DNA testing, the Argentine Supreme
Court ruled to the contrary, holding that judges may not force people to
give blood samples for genetic testing to determine whether or not they are
children of the disappeared.5 1 Perhaps setting the stage for the DNA law,
the Court said that despite its ruling, less invasive ways of obtaining the
DNA, such as seizing personal items, would pass constitutional muster.
52
44. See Oren, supra note 35, at 129.
45. See Avery, supra note 37, at 253.
46. See id.
47. Howard LaFranchi, Relentless Grandmothers: Argentina Seeks Justice for Kid-
napped Children, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1999, at 1. There were instances where
the raising parents were innocent of any wrongdoing, having believed that they were
legally adopting unwanted children. Internet Interview with Leonardo Filippini, Law
Professor at the University of Palermo and the University of San Andres in Buenos Aires
(Sept. 22, 2010) (transcript on file with the author). In these situations, the Abuelas
maintained that the children could stay with their adoptive families, rather than being
returned to their biological ones, as long as the biological family members had a role in
the children's lives. See Avery, supra note 37, at 255.
48. See Law No. 23.511, June 1, 1987, [XLIV-D], A.D.L.A. 3373, http://infoleg.
mecon.gov.ar/scriptsl/busquedas/cnsnorma.asp?tipo=Ley&nro=23511.
49. See Avery, supra note 37, at 252.
50. See Oren, supra note 35, at 149.
51. See Argentina's Supreme Court Rejects Forced Blood Tests on Suspected 'Dirty War'
Orphans, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Aug. 11, 2009 [hereinafter HAMILTON SPECTATOR].
52. Memorandum from Centro Internacional para la Justicia Transicionat [ICTJ] on
Obtenci6n de muestras de ADN en el proceso penal [Obtaining DNA Samples in the
Cornell International Law Journal
The case involved a couple who registered two children of the disappeared
as the couple's own children.5 3 When this fact came to light, the Abuelas
were able to get a judge to order the adult children to give blood samples,
and they refused.5 4 According to two of the Justices, "[t]he right of biologi-
cal families to know the truth does not mean that the other victim should
shoulder all the emotional and legal consequences of establishing a new
identity. '55
Beginning in 2006, federal judges in Argentina started to order
searches of people's homes, largely due to the refusal of individuals sus-
pected of being children of the disappeared to undergo DNA testing.5 6
Many of those refusing did so because they did not want to provide evi-
dence for legal action against their parents. 5 7 Interestingly, in Argentine
Supreme Court cases in the mid-1990s, where the raising parents asserted
that compulsory blood tests violated their own right to privacy, the Court
held that there was no violation because the basis of the raising parents'
argument was to create an obstacle to the investigation. Moreover, the
Court held that the issue was one of standing: The raising parents were the
suspects, while the children were victims and third parties to the case. 58
D. Compulsory DNA Testing Becomes Official Procedure
In November 2009, based on the outcomes of these cases and the need
for a uniform approach to DNA testing in cases of illegal adoption and
falsification of identity, the Argentine Congress amended Article 218 of the
National Criminal Procedure Code to allow judges to order compulsory
DNA testing in certain circumstances. 59 In these situations, judges may
issue warrants in order to obtain DNA samples from personal items.60
Under the new Article 218, the judge's decision to order the test must be
based on the principles of necessity, reasonableness, and proportional-
ity.6 1 Furthermore, the least intrusive methods of obtaining the DNA must
be used, taking gender and other circumstances into consideration. 6 2 In
no circumstance may the methods exceed the minimum level of coercion
Penal Process] to el Senado de la Naci6n Argentina [Senate of Argentina] 9 (Nov. 17,
2009), http://es.ictj.org/images/content/1/8/1854.pdf. See also Corte Suprema de la
Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [Supreme Court for the Justice of the Nation], 08/11/2009,
"Gualtieri Rugone de Prieto, Emma Elidia y otros s/sustracci6n de menores de 10 ahios" -
causa n' 46/85A, (Arg).
53. See HAMILTON SPECTATOR, supra note 51,
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Sebastian Lacunza, New Methods to Identify Dictatorship's Missing Children,
INTER PRESS SERVICE (Sept. 30, 2008), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44076.
57. See id.
58. See Oren, supra note 35, at 154.
59. DNA Law, supra note 7.
60. See Ximena Marinero, Argentina Senate Approves Law to Compel DNA from Sus-
pected 'Dirty War' Children, JURIST (Nov. 20, 2009), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2009/
11/argentina-senate-approves-law-to-compel.php.
61. CODE CRIMINAL [C. CrIM] art. 218bis, para. 1.
62. Id. at para. 3.
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required. 63 The law specifies that, if a criminal prosecution requires a DNA
sample from the victim, the extraction of the DNA must be done in a way
that prevents revictimization and protects the victim's rights. 64 If the victim
refuses to provide DNA, the judge may order the seizure of personal
items.65 The law as written does not provide any recourse to someone who
wants his or her privacy protected and who does not want to provide a
DNA sample. Having one's possessions seized for testing cannot be called a
suitable alternative; the right to privacy is still violated in this scenario.
66
Despite this apparent victory for the Abuelas and others trying to
establish their own identity or the identity of others, the law has critics. In
November 2009, a survey conducted by La Nacidn, a conservative newspa-
per, showed that 77% of its readers opposed the law.67 Some critics say
that the compulsory extraction of DNA violates privacy rights68 and the
victim's right to choose not to know his or her biological origins.6 9 Former
prosecutor Julio Strassera, who put some of the former junta leaders on
trial, argues, "If an adult doesn't want to know his origins, you have to
respect that."'70
Furthermore, the law may be the first of its kind to require compul-
sory DNA testing of people not suspected of crimes. 7 1 There are also con-
cerns that the law could be read expansively, giving judges too much
discretion to decide when DNA extraction is "absolutely necessary.
72
Though concerns about the DNA law go beyond the concerns of adult chil-
dren who do not want to know their biological origins, dialogue about the
law has focused on this specific situation.
Proponents of the law, however, contend that the need to clarify the
events for the historical record, and the human rights violations at issue tip
the balance in favor of compulsory testing over privacy. 7 3 Still others main-
tain that the adult children should not be put in a position where they have
to decide whether or not to seek their true identity. Horacio Pietragalla,
who learned in 2003 that he was a child of the disappeared, insists that,
"The state cannot leave in the hands of a young person, raised by a member
of the military, manipulated by guilt, the decision of whether to not to
learn his true identity."'74 Of course, taking this very personal, perhaps life-
63. Id. at para. 4.
64. Id. at para. 5.
65. Id.
66. Although there is certainly a difference between seizure for criminal prosecution
purposes and seizure due to private interests, in this scenario the very personal items-
the genetic material of the completely innocent individual-is being forcibly seized.
67. Joel Richards, New DNA Law in Argentina Will Help Find the Missing Grandchil-
dren, NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, Nov. 12, 2009, at 1-2.
68. See Lacunza, supra note 56.
69. See Marinero, supra note 60.
70. See Associated Press article, supra note 13.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Lacunza, supra note 56.
74. See Associated Press article, supra note 13.
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changing decision out of the adult children's hands amounts to forcing
unwanted knowledge on them.
Thus, while the proponents of the DNA law argue for truth and knowl-
edge of the events that transpired during the dictatorship, critics assert the
primacy of the individual's right to privacy. Supported by the tireless work
of the Abuelas and the Argentine government, the law and the National
Bank of Genetic Data are designed to assist in the search for justice follow-
ing the horrific events of the Dirty War.
II. A Unique Set of Facts?
At first blush, the stolen baby situation seems truly unique: Children
are taken from their parents and given to others; then, after thirty years,
groups attempt to identify the biological origins of these adult children
through the use of compulsory DNA tests, the results of which could put
the raising parents in jail. Argentina is not, however, the first country to
separate parents and children as a way to redirect the values of the next
generation.7 5 One can easily think of other contexts in which Argentina's
approach to this issue can provide guidance for the future.
In fact, nearly any situation in which families are separated can be
analogized to the Argentine context. For example, in the aftermath of the
1994 Rwandan genocide, surviving women-both Hutu and Tutsi-were
known to raise orphaned children. 76 Natural disasters and wars may sepa-
rate children from their parents. Not knowing who is still alive, survivors
proceed in a new life as best they can. Years later, these children may not
want to know if the people who have raised them are their biological
parents.
These circumstances lack the criminal context present in Argentina,
but we may see a comparable situation in the future. For example, once the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has ended, we will
face the question of whether prosecutions as a form of transitional justice
should occur. 7 7 The hostilities in the DRC have been marked by the heavy
use of rape as a weapon of war. 78 In this "Rape Capital of the World," over
75. The dictatorship's plan of having the children of the disappeared raised by fami-
lies sympathetic to the government may have been inspired by General Franco in Spain.
See Castillo, supra note 8. In addition, from the late 1800s through the mid-1900s, the
government of Australia engaged in a systematic campaign to remove Aboriginal chil-
dren from their homes and place them with Caucasian families as a way to eradicate the
Aboriginal way of life. See generally, PETER READ, THE STOLEN GENERATIONS: THE REMOVAL
OF ABORIGINAL CHILDREN IN NEW SOUTH WALES 1883 TO 1969, (4th ed. 2006), available at
http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/publications/StolenGenerations.pdf.
76. See Jessica Roemischer, Ladies First, WHAT Is ENLIGHTENMENT?, Dec. 2005-Feb.
2006, available at http://www.enlightennext.org/magazine/j31/reviews.asp?page=4
(reviewing PBS's "Wide Angle" Production, "[a] video and multimedia presentation on
women in Rwanda").
77. The Democratic Republic of Congo has experienced a brutal war for at least the
past decade, and rape has been increasingly used as a war tactic. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettle-
man, 600 Raped on Border of Congo, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at A4.
78. See Joy Wanja, Culture of Impunity Thrives in the Rape Dens of Eastern Congo, EAST
AFRICAN (Ken.), Dec. 27, 2010, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Culture+of+impu-
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200,000 cases of rape and sexual assault have been reported and
thousands more have likely gone unreported since the conflict began in
1996. 7 9 It is highly likely, therefore, that there have been children born,
and that there will be children born, as the result of rape. Should the DRC
decide to prosecute the perpetrators of the atrocities during the conflict,
prosecutors might add rape to the litany of available charges. In such a
case, a child born of rape could provide DNA evidence. Like their counter-
parts in Argentina, however, these children may prefer not to know their
biological origins.80
Thus, while the facts leading to the passage of the DNA law in Argen-
tina and the resulting conflict between the rights to truth and privacy seem
specific to the context of the Argentine dictatorship, they may appear in
other situations around the world. How Argentina addresses this issue is
relevant beyond its borders, given its contributions and past efforts at jus-
tice in the wake of mass atrocity. Argentina was one of the first countries to
pursue trials in the transitional justice context, 8 1 and it has also employed
amnesties, 82 the first well-known truth commission,8 3 and truth trials,
8 4
among other mechanisms of justice.8 5 Moreover, in its quest for justice,
nity+thrives+in+the+rape+dens+of+eastern+Congo+/-/2558/1078712/-/auauokz/-/
index.html.
79. See Joy Wanja, The Congo Raping Fields, DAILY NATION (Ken.) (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://www.nation.co.ke/Features/DN2/The+Congo+raping+fields+/-/957860/10756
58/-/mwfgqp/-/index.html.
80. The DRC example differs from the Argentine context, of course, in the sense that
the child will likely not have an attachment to the parent who committed the crime (in
this case, rape).
81. See Panel: The Justice Cascade in Latin America, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 345,
346 (2007) (symposium transcript of Naomi Roht-Arriaza's statement).
82. See Law No. 23.492, Dec. 24, 1986, [XLIV-A] A.D.L.A. 1100 (Full Stop Law)
(imposing a 60-day statute of limitations for all crimes related to the Dirty War, thereby
limiting the number of cases that could be brought before Argentine courts); see also
Law No. 23.521, June 4, 1987, [XLIV-A] A.LJ.A 260 (Due Obedience Law) (providing an
irrefutable presumption of innocence for any medium or lower rank member of the
armed forces based on the doctrine of command responsibility).
83. See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND
ATROCITY 16 (2002).
84. EAAF (EQuIPO ARGENTINO DE ANTROPOLOGiA FORENSE), Special Section: Right to
Truth, in 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 130, 131 (2002). Truth trials involve the investigation of
human rights abuses protected by an amnesty. The objective is to develop a record of the
truth, though no criminal penalties are imposed. See id.
85. A country emerging from conflict characterized by mass atrocity has several
options for dealing with the past, depending on the country's attitudes and goals for the
future. Truth commissions, in which testimony is taken from anyone affected by the
conflict who wants to share his or her story, aim to create a historical record of the
events. A country preferring truth above all else might opt for the establishment of a
truth commission. Trials are an option for a country pursuing justice, though only indi-
viduals can be put on trial, which can present challenges when entire governments are
responsible for the crimes committed. Amnesties or pardons are more likely to be
selected as a transitional justice mechanism when the new government wants to forge
ahead and look to the future instead of the past. For more on mechanisms of accounta-
bility, see Elizabeth B. Ludwin, Trials and Truth Commissions in Argentina and El Salva-
dor, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 275-76
(Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003). Also, see generally HAYNER, supra note 83; and Ivan
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Argentina formed the first forensic anthropology team, which, since its cre-
ation in 1986 to identify the disappeared, has worked in over thirty coun-
tries.8 6 Argentina has been experimenting with post-conflict justice
initiatives for nearly thirty years, and countries in transition have benefit-
ted from the Argentine transitional justice experience. During this time, the
international community has been watching and taking notes; the compul-
sory DNA testing of innocent adults to build evidence in criminal cases
against their parents is another experiment in transitional justice that the
world will scrutinize.
III. The Right to Privacy: Fundamental, But Not Absolute
Of the two rights pitted against each other by the enforcement of
Argentina's DNA law, the right to privacy is more established in interna-
tional human rights law.8 7 Under the DNA law, the adult child suspected
of having been illegally adopted is unable to exercise her right to privacy,
which, in this case, is her ability to control the dissemination of informa-
tion about herself. It is not the minimal intrusion of a cheek swab that
presents the problem; what matters is the information contained on that
swab and what happens to it. The privacy violation is, thus, the same,
whether the DNA is obtained via cheek swab or seizure of personal items.
By examining the various definitions and interpretations of the right to
privacy, how it has developed, where it is codified, and how it has been
applied in the international human rights arena, one can get a clearer pic-
ture of the right to privacy and how it may conflict with other rights.
A. International Sources of a Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is a fundamental right, first enunciated in the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): "No one shall be
subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or corre-
spondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."8 8 It includes the right to control access to personal information
about oneself, which is at the crux of the DNA law controversy. 8 9 When
construed narrowly, privacy encompasses this very idea: the control of dis-
semination of personal information. When construed more broadly, how-
ever, notions of privacy include anonymity and restrictions on physical
Simonovic, Attitudes and Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes and Human Rights
Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 343 (2004).
86. See O'Connell, supra note 8, at 322.
87. As will be addressed in the next section, the right to truth is a relatively newly-
established right in the human rights spectrum, whereas the right to privacy was codi-
fied as early as 1948 in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. See Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(II1), art. 12 (Dec.
10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
88. Id.
89. See Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal Information
Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy - Is There a Match?, 22 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
307, 312 (2008).
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access.
90
Although the right to privacy gained prominence in international
human rights law after its inclusion in the UDHR, concerns about personal
privacy in the European Union have historical roots in the way the Nazis
seized personal records in order to target specific people in the 1930s and
1940s.9 1 More recently, domestic privacy laws have been adopted and
amended in countries in Central Europe and South America to remedy
injustices of prior authoritarian regimes.9 2
The right to privacy has been included in several major human rights
instruments: the UDHR, 93 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), 9 4 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,9 5 as well
as regional human rights conventions in Latin America, 96 the Middle
East, 9 7 and Europe. 98 The right has generally proceeded down two paths,
with some agreements treating privacy as a negative right prohibiting arbi-
trary interference with what is typically treated as the private sphere: the
home, the person, and correspondence. 9 9 Other conventions treat privacy
as a positive right, asserting that everyone has a right to respect for his
home, his personal life, and his correspondence. 0 0 On a domestic level,
90. Norbert Gilmore, Drug Use and Human Rights: Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability,
and Human Rights Infringements, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 355, 409 (1996).
91. See Newman, supra note 89, at 328.
92. See Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Prac-
tice, GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN, http://gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2011).
93. See UDHR, supra note 87, at art. 12.
94. See ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 17.
95. See CRC, supra note 15, at art. 16.
96. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 11, Nov. 21, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978) [hereinafter ACHR].
97. See Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, art. 18, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (Aug. 5, 1990) [hereinafter
Cairo Declaration].
98. See European Convention, supra note 15. Interestingly, the African (Banjul)
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is silent as to the right to privacy, which likely
reflects the notion that the Charter focuses on collective, not individual, rights. See
Organization of African Unity, African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
adoptedJune 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
99. Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/64/211 (Aug. 3, 2009) (by Martin
Scheinin) [hereinafter Scheinin]; see also ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 17; UDHR, supra
note 87, at art. 12; CRC, supra note 15, at art. 16; International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, art. 14,
G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990) (entered into force July 1,
2003) (stating in language similar to the other conventions cited, "No migrant worker or
member of his or her family shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his or her privacy, family, home, correspondence or other communications, or to unlaw-
ful attacks on his or her honour and reputation. Each migrant worker and member of
his or her family shall have the right to the protection of the law against such interfer-
ence or attacks.").
100. See Scheinin, supra note 99, at 6; see also European Convention, supra note 15, at
art. 18; Cairo Declaration, supra note 97, at art. 8 (stating in language similar to the
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national constitutions do not always explicitly mention privacy, but nearly
all countries recognize its fundamental importance.' 0 1
Both regional and international tribunals have adjudicated cases
involving the right to privacy. In 2008, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) unanimously ruled that Britain's DNA and fingerprint stor-
ing policy violated the right to privacy. 10 2 The case was brought by two
men who had been arrested on separate occasions and ultimately
released, 10 3 but whose DNA and fingerprints remained in the British
database. The men requested that the samples be destroyed, but the police
declined to do SO. 1 0 4 " In their submission to the ECHR, the applicants
alleged that the DNA and fingerprint policy violated Article 8 of the [Euro-
pean] Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
provides in relevant part, "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his pri-
vate ... life .... There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society . . . for the prevention of disorder or
crime."10 5 The Court ultimately found that the DNA and fingerprint reten-
tion policy failed to balance equally the state and individual interests at
issue. It held that the retention constituted "a disproportionate interference
with the applicants' right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded
as necessary for a democratic society."'10 6
The right to privacy also played a role in a 2007 case before the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC), 1 0 7 in which the ICC addressed the right to
privacy as related to searches and seizures of homes for criminal evi-
dence. 10 8 Defendant Thomas Lubanga Dyilo argued that a search that vio-
lated the Congolese Code of Criminal Procedure amounted to an unlawful
European Convention, "Everyone shall have the right to privacy in the conduct of his
private affairs, in his home, among his family, with regard to his property and his rela-
tionships."). Negative rights require that states refrain from acting in a way that violates
the rights of individuals, while positive rights require states to take action to protect the
rights of individuals. See MASHOOD A. BADERIN & ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION 13 (2007).
101. See Scheinin, supra note 99, at 6.
102. See S. & Marper v. U.K., [2008] Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30562/04; see also Sarah
Lyall, European Court Rules Against Britain's Policy of Keeping DNA Database of Suspects,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A16.
103. S. was acquitted, and the charges against Marper were dropped. See S. & Marper,
[2008] Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 10-11.
104. Id. at para. 12.
105. European Convention, supra note 15, at art. 8.
106. S. & Marper, [2008] Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 125.
107. Interestingly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes no
mention of the right to privacy. See AndrewJ. Walker, When a Good Idea is Poorly Imple-
mented: How the International Criminal Court Fails to be Insulated from International
Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245, 278 (2004).
108. A 1997 case from the European Court of Human Rights stated that states may
conduct searches and seizures of residences-clearly an interference in the right to pri-
vacy-to obtain evidence of a criminal offense. See Camenzind v. Switz., [1997] Eur. Ct.
H.R., App. No. 21353/93, at para. 45. An interference of this sort may be lawful, so long
as the State action was "proportionate to the aim pursued." Id.
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infringement of his right to privacy. 10 9 In this case, the Congolese police
executed a search warrant of a home in the absence of the defendant and of
the resident, in violation of national law. 110 The Pre-Trial Chamber
acknowledged that the search contravened national law, but that the inter-
ference with the right of privacy was not "so serious to amount to a viola-
tion of the internationally recognized human right.""' The Chamber then
proceeded to evaluate the search and seizure in light of the principle of
proportionality, finding that the search was conducted in a manner dispro-
portionate to the state's interests." 12
These two contexts illustrate the importance of the right to privacy in
international law, and the limitations of its reach. Although care must be
taken to keep personal information private when consent has not been
granted, the right to privacy cannot necessarily be used to protect an indi-
vidual from a criminal investigation. The DNA law raises both issues-the
protection of personal information and a criminal investigation. The natu-
ral inquiry, then, involves the limits on the right to privacy.
B. Limits on the Right to Privacy
Despite the fundamental nature of the right to privacy, derogations
under certain circumstances are permissible." 3 The ICCPR is one of the
primary international human rights accords'n 4 Article 17 addresses the
right to privacy:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such inter-
ference or attacks.' 15
Article 4 allows states parties to derogate from certain rights in the
ICCPR, though only when there is an officially proclaimed state of emer-
gency that threatens the nation.116 If a state party elects to derogate from a
provision of the Covenant, it must inform the other states parties, via the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN). 117
In 1988, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a group of independent
experts that issue authoritative interpretations of the ICCPR, released Gen-
109. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 72 (Pre-Trial Chamber I for the Int'l Crim. Ct.
Jan. 29, 2007).
110. See id.
111. Id. at para. 78.
112. See id. at paras. 89-90.
113. See id. at para. 75.
114. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 152 (2d ed. 2001).
115. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 17.
116. Id. at art. 4(1).
117. Id. at art. 4(3).
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eral Comment 16 on the right to privacy (Art. 17).118 In this General Com-
ment, the HRC noted that the right to privacy is not absolute: "As all
persons live in society, the protection of privacy is necessarily relative." 119
Despite these guidelines on permissible derogations, "States have only
rarely resorted to the acknowledged mechanisms available under interna-
tional law in general, and the Covenant in particular, for unilateral excep-
tions to the right to privacy." 1 2 0 Thus, it appears that states parties are
generally satisfied with the framework of Article 17.121
Other articles in the ICCPR include provisions for permissible limita-
tions of the relevant right. For example, Article 21, regarding the right of
peaceful assembly, provides:
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others. 1 2 2
Other articles, such as 12 (freedom of movement), 18 (freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion), 19 (freedom of expression), and 22 (freedom of
association) include similar language. 1 23 Article 17, the right to privacy,
notably does not contain this limiting language. In this situation, common
sense treaty interpretation indicates that the omission of a limitations
clause in Article 17 is purposeful and, in absence of specific language to
the contrary, cannot be read to include such a clause inherently. 124 As
such, it appears that the right to privacy is a protected right.1 25
Despite the difference in wording between Article 17 and the above-
mentioned articles with limitations clauses, state practice suggests that
states frequently make exceptions to privacy rights in certain contexts,
such as a criminal investigation. The ICC has not treated the right to pri-
118. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, (Twenty-third session,
1988), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HR1/Gen/1/Rev.1 at 21 (1994).
119. Id., at para. 7.
120. See Scheinin, supra note 99, at 7.
121. See id.
122. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 21.
123. Id. at arts. 12, 18, 19, 22.
124. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codifies international law
on this subject, provides that treaty terms should be interpreted in accordance with their
ordinary meaning. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, adopted May 22,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
125. It should be noted, however, that the [European] Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does contain a limitations clause with
regard to the right to privacy. Article 8(2) states that, "[tihere shall be no interference by
a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others." European Convention, supra note 15.
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vacy as an absolute right from which no derogations are permitted. 126 For
example, in the Lubanga case, after determining that there was no serious
violation of international human rights, the Court evaluated whether the
principle of proportionality was violated when Congolese national authori-
ties searched a private home and seized hundreds of documents for the
purpose of a domestic criminal investigation. 127 Citing precedent from the
European Court of Human Rights, 128 the Court found that the search was
indiscriminate and not proportionate to the objectives of the national
authorities. Nevertheless, it balanced the seriousness of the violation
against the fairness of the trial as a whole and admitted the evidence.
12 9
Likewise, in S. and Marper v. U.K., the European Court of Human
Rights also engaged in a balancing test between state and individual inter-
ests in the context of the retention of DNA fingerprint samples of uncon-
victed persons. The Court found that the applicants' right to privacy had
been violated by Britain's retention policy.130 The right to privacy may be a
fundamental right, but limited derogations are permitted, and any deroga-
tion or limitation on the right to privacy must be proportionate to the gov-
ernment interest at issue. In the instant case, the compulsory extraction of
DNA from an innocent person is balanced against the government's inter-
est in establishing the truth and prosecuting suspects of crimes committed
during the military dictatorship.
As stated above, the right to privacy is not absolute. In the criminal
context, the right to privacy can-and often does-conflict with state inter-
ests that may be sufficient to render the derogation of the right legitimate.
In this context, "the individual right to privacy is balanced against a socie-
tal interest in which that same individual is assumed to have a stake."
13 1
When privacy is viewed this way, the individual right often loses to the
societal right.132 Thus, an examination of the nature of the societal right,
the right to truth, is the logical next step in this analysis.
IV. The Right to the Truth
During the dictatorship in Argentina, as in many other countries in
126. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 81 (Pre-Trial Chamber I for the Int'l Crim. Ct.
Jan. 29, 2007).
127. Id.
128. Id. at paras. 79-81 (citing Miailhe v. France, Judgment of 25 February 1993,
Application No. 12661/87, para. 39).
129. Id. at paras. 89-90. The ICCPR echoes this balancing test, stating that an inter-
ference with the right to personal integrity "is permissible only when it transpires in
accordance with the national legal system under non-arbitrary circumstances," that is,
when it serves a legitimate governmental purpose and respects proportionality. MAN-
FRED NowAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 295
(1993).
130. See S. & Marper v. U.K., [2008] Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30562/04, at para. 125.
131. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 213 (1995) (reissued July 1, 2009).
132. See Newman, supra note 89, at 319.
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the world, 13 3 disappearance was a deliberate tactic of oppression. Disap-
pearance is an effective tool for a regime because once a person disappears,
there is no information available about what happened; the power of disap-
pearance lies in the unknown. The authorities maintain ignorance, and
thus, the family members of the disappeared are left to choose between
believing that the victim is still alive or mourning a loss. 13 4 As such, the
Inter-American Court has characterized enforced disappearance as a "con-
tinuous violation of many rights under the [American Convention on
Human Rights] that State Parties are obligated to respect and guaran-
tee."'13 5 Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has declared
enforced disappearance to be a continuing offense. 136 Through a review of
the development and codification of the right to truth, one can see how the
right to truth emerges to combat the unknown that results from a cam-
paign of disappearance.
A. Definition and Development of the Right
According to a UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) study,
"[t]he right to the truth implies knowing the full and complete truth as to
the events that transpired, their specific circumstances, and who partici-
pated in them, including knowing the circumstances in which the viola-
tions took place, as well as the reasons for them."' 137 It is a procedural right
that becomes relevant after the commission of a human rights violation
where the authorities fail to provide information about the first viola-
133. Countries as different as Chechnya, Chile, and Pakistan have all practiced disap-
pearance. See generally Joseph Barrett, Chechnya's Last Hope? Enforced Disappearances
and the European Court of Human Rights, 22 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 133 (2009) (discussing
enforced disappearances in Chechnya); David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the
Responsibility to Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 111 (2008) (discussing enforced
disappearances in Chile); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DENYING THE UNDENIABLE: ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCES IN PAKISTAN (2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/ASA33/018/2008/en/0de43038-57dd-1 Idd-be62-3f7ba2157024/asa330182008
eng.pdf (discussing enforced disappearances in Pakistan).
134. According to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, "enforced disappearance" means "the arrest, detention, abduc-
tion or any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law." International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance art. 2, adopted Dec. 20, 2006, 61 U.N.T.S. 488 (entered into
force Dec. 23, 2010) (emphasis added).
135. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, para. 155 (1988).
136. See Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 25781/94, at para. 151. The
reasons behind characterizing disappearance as a continuous crime are twofold: (1) the
fate of the person is still unknown, and (2) the family members' pain and suffering at
not knowing the fate of the disappeared person continues until information is provided.
See generally, Petra Dijkstra, et al., Enforced Disappearances as Continuing Violations,
AMSTERDAM INTERNATIONAL LAW CLINIC (2002).
137. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights: Study on the Right to the Truth, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8,
2006) [hereinafter ECOSOC].
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tion. 138 The family of a disappeared person has the right, therefore, to
know what happened to its loved one. Knowledge, at least in theory, will
lead to the possibility of closure, a restoration of dignity, and the prospect
of reparations and redress. 139
The Inter-American human rights system, which has established sub-
stantial jurisprudence in this area, 140 has found the right to truth to be
enshrined in Article 25 (right to judicial protection), Article 1(1) (obliga-
tion to respect rights), Article 8 (right to a fair trial), and Article 13 (free-
dom of thought and expression) of the American Convention on Human
Rights. 14 1 The Inter-American Court has situated the right to truth within
this broader context, and, as a result, "the court ensures not only the right
to truth but the right to justice"'142 because it imposes a duty on the state to
investigate, prosecute, and punish human rights abuses. 143 The essence of
the right to truth is knowledge in the face of secrecy, the triumph of disclo-
sure over impunity.
Although generally associated with enforced disappearances, the right
to truth can trace its origins back to international humanitarian law, and
the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 14 4 Articles 32 and 33
of Additional Protocol I assert that families have the right to know the fate
of their relatives, 145 and spell out the duty to search for missing persons
and to report on their findings. 14 6 Today, however, the right to truth is
138. See Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, 88
INT'L REv. RED CROSS 245, 249 (2006).
139. See id.
140. See Morgane Landel, Proposals for a Truth Commission and Reparations Program
for Victims of Torture By US Forces Since 9/11, 16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 115, 120
(2009).
141. See, e.g., cases 11.505, 11.532, 11.541, 11.546, 11.549, 11.569, 11.572, 11.573,
11.583, 11.595, 11.657, 11.705 v. Chile, Alfonso Rent Chanfeau Orayce, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 25/98, OEA/Ser.L./V/I1.95, doc. 7 rev. at 512 (1997).
142. Dermot Groome, The Right to Truth in the Fight Against Impunity, 29 BERKELEYJ.
INT'L L. 175, 184 (2011).
143. See Velisquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 174-76 (1988).
144. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1979) [hereinafter Protocol I]; see
also ECOSOC, supra note 137, at 6.
145. Article 32 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states, "In the
implementation of this Section, the activities of the High Contracting Parties, of the Par-
ties to the conflict and of the international humanitarian organizations mentioned in the
Conventions and in this Protocol shall be prompted mainly by the right of families to
know the fate of their relatives." Protocol I, supra note 144, at art. 32.
146. Article 33 states, in part:
1. As soon as circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active
hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall search for the persons who have been
reported missing by an adverse Party. Such adverse Party shall transmit all rele-
vant information concerning such persons in order to facilitate such searches.
2. In order to facilitate the gathering of information pursuant to the preceding
paragraph, each Party to the conflict shall, with respect to persons who would
not receive more favourable consideration under the Conventions and this
Protocol:
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linked most often to transitional justice situations involving widespread
enforced disappearance, though it has been extended to cover other serious
violations of human rights, including extrajudicial execution and
torture.
1 4 7
Many of these transitional justice situations are the result of the cli-
mate of impunity for human rights abuses during authoritarian regimes in
Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. The right to truth emerged, in
part, as a response to the widespread practice of enforced disappearances,
and garnered the attention of several human rights groups, including the
UN Working Group on Enforced Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID),
the UN Human Rights Committee, and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. 148
The landmark Velasquez-Rodrfguez case in 1988 set the legal founda-
tion for the right to truth. 149 In this case, the Inter-American Court con-
cluded that states have a duty to promote and protect rights, and to
investigate, and punish abuses. 150 As the number of groups making recom-
mendations or issuing reports about the right to the truth increased, the
more surefooted the Veldsquez-Rodriguez holding became in the catalogue
of international human rights.
While the right to the truth initially encompassed the right to know
the fate and whereabouts of disappeared persons, as the scope of the right
has evolved, so too have the components contained therein. The UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights contends that the right to truth involves:
the entitlement to seek and obtain information on: the causes leading to the
person's victimization; the causes and conditions pertaining to the gross vio-
lations of international human rights law and serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law; the progress and results of the investigation; the
circumstances and reasons for the perpetration of crimes under interna-
tional law and gross human rights violations; the circumstances in which
violations took place; in the event of death, missing or enforced disappear-
ance, the fate and whereabouts of the victims; and the identity of the
perpetrators. 151
(a) record the information specified in Article 138 of the Fourth Convention in
respect of such persons who have been detained, imprisoned or otherwise held
in captivity for more than two weeks as a result of hostilities or occupation, or
who have died during any period of detention;
(b) to the fullest extent possible, facilitate and, if need be, carry out the search
for and the recording of information concerning such persons if they have died
in other circumstances as a result of hostilities or occupation.
Id. at art. 33.
147. ECOSOC, supra note 137, at 5.
148. See Francesca Lessa, The Enforcement of the Right to Truth in National Practice:
Non-Judicial Alternatives to Prosecution in Argentina and Uruguay 4 (Mar. 27, 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. paper, London School of Economics).
149. See VelAsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 166 (1988).
150. Id. at paras. 174-76.
151. ECOSOC, supra note 137, at 11.
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The Committee of the Red Cross has gone further, stating that the right to
truth is a norm of customary international law.' 52
It is critical to note, however, that thus far, all courts, as well as
national and international bodies, that have discussed the right to truth
have involved a two-party scenario: the families of the disappeared and the
governments who allegedly caused the disappearances. By contrast, the
Argentine context has three distinct parties: the parents of the victims of
enforced disappearance, the children who may have been born to disap-
peared parents, and the government. In fact, much of the push for the DNA
law came from the Abuelas, not the government. Thus, it is unclear
whether the same interpretations of the various human rights conventions
would apply in such three-party cases.
B. Codification
In 2005, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance explicitly codified the right to truth for the
first time.153 Article 24(2) of the Convention provides that "[elach victim
has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced
disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of
the disappeared person. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures
in this regard."' 154 One month after Iraq became the twentieth state to ratify
the treaty on December 23, 2010, the Convention entered into force.
155
This explicit codification contrasts with the way the right to truth has been
recognized in other human rights instruments.
Despite the recent, explicit acknowledgment of the right to truth in the
Enforced Disappearance Convention, the right has been alluded to at the
regional and international level for years, usually through provisions
requiring states to inform relatives of the fate and whereabouts of vic-
tims. 156 Moreover, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated
that the right is linked to the right to seek, receive, and impart informa-
tion,15 7 as codified in Article 19 of the UDHR. 15 8 The African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights contains a similar article that provides for "the
right to receive information."' 5 9 The ICCPR contains no explicit right to
truth, but the right has been invoked in relation to Article 23, which guar-
152. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ET AL., CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Vol. 1, 421 (Cambridge University Press 2005).
153. See generally International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From
Enforced Disappearance, supra note 134.
154. Id. at art. 24(2).
155. See Int'l Fed'n for Human Rights (FIDH), The International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances Enters into Force on 23 December
2010 (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.fidh.org/The-International-Convention-for-the-
Protection.
156. See Org. of Am. States, Preliminary Draft Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights (Pact of Sane Jose), AG/RES. 666 (XII-0/83), para. 5
(Nov. 18, 1983); see also AG/RES. 742 (XIV-0/84), para. 5 (Nov. 17, 1984).
157. See ECOSOC, supra note 137, at 11.
158. UDHR, supra note 87, at art. 19; see also HAYNER, supra note 83, at 31.
159. Banjul Charter, supra note 98, at art. 9.
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antees protection of the family. 160 Similarly, the Convention on the Rights
of the Child has been said to contain an implicit right to truth in its provi-
sions on the right of a child not to be separated from his or her parents
161
and the right to the preservation of identity. 16 2
The Inter-American Court has addressed the issue of the right to truth
on several occasions. It has repeatedly recognized the right of relatives to
learn the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones, 163 though notably not
in the context of a conflict with other rights. In addition, the Inter-Ameri-
can Court has connected the right to truth with the right to obtain an
explanation of the facts of a human rights violation and the responsibility
of the State: through Article 8 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, the right to a hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal, and through Article 25, the right to an effective remedy. 16 4 Fur-
thermore, the Inter-American Court has opined that the right to truth is not
limited to cases of enforced disappearances, but that it applies to all gross
human rights violations. 165
More recently, since 2005, the Updated Set of Principles for the Pro-
tection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impu-
nity has included the right to the truth, stating:
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events
concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances
and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the perpe-
tration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth
provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations. 166
On the domestic level, Argentina explicitly recognized the right to
truth in 2005.167 So too has the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which has based the right to truth on provisions in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. 168 In particular, the Chamber noted
that the right is associated with the Convention's right to be free from tor-
ture and ill treatment, as well as the right to family life, and the State's
obligation to investigate violations of the Convention.' 69 In the cases
160. See ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 23.
161. See CRC, supra note 15, at art. 9.
162. Id. at art. 8.
163. See Veltsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (set. C) No. 4, para. 181 (1988).
164. See id.; see also Blake Case, Judgment of Jan. 24, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 36, para. 97 (1998).
165. See Tibi v. Ecuador, Judgment of Sept. 7, 2004, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
114 (2004).
166. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
through Action to Combat Impunity, Principle 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1
(Feb. 8, 2005).
167. See Agreement of 1 September 2003 of the National Chamber for Federal Crimi-
nal and Correctional Matters, Caso Suarez Mason, Rol. 450 and Caso Escuela Mecanica de
la Armada, Rol. 761.
168. See Palic v. Republika Srpska, Case No. CH/99/3196, Decision on Admissibility
and Merits (Jan. 11, 2001).
169. Id.
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regarding the massacre at Srebrenica, the Human Rights Chamber "found
that the failure of Republika Srpska authorities 'to inform the applicants
about the truth of the fate and whereabouts of their missing loved ones'
including their failure to conduct a 'meaningful and effective investigation
into the massacre,' violated Article 3 of the European Convention."' 170
This level of codification, while not as ingrained in international
human rights law as the right to privacy, is indicative of the right-to-truth's
status as a fundamental human right. It has progressed from being implied
through the exercise of other human rights to being mentioned explicitly
both in the Enforced Disappearance Convention and the Updated Set of
Principles. The increasing prominence of the right to truth obligates states
to enforce it. Nevertheless, the question remains how a state can fulfill the
requirement that it protect this right while simultaneously confronted with
another fundamental right.
V. Resolving the Conflict of Rights?
The Argentine DNA law clearly pits the right to privacy against the
right to truth. It favors truth at the expense of privacy, leaving the adult
child with the choice of providing a DNA sample or waiting for the police to
come to his or her house with a search warrant to seize personal items.1 71
Is this outcome legitimate under international human rights law?
To undertake this inquiry, one must explore the relationship between
the rights and the rights-holders, as well as the goals and concerns of the
interested parties. Then, an analysis of human rights law and state practice
leads to the conclusion that it is unclear whether truth or privacy should
prevail. In these indeterminate situations, international law dictates that
states should not be restricted from acting. 172 Argentina, then, is left to use
its judgment to determine whether to favor one right over another. But the
finding that the DNA law may legitimately favor truth over privacy does not
mean it is the optimal path for Argentina's efforts to target raising parents
who acted illegally. There are other solutions to the truth versus privacy
conundrum of the Argentine DNA law that may maximize the satisfaction
of all parties involved.
A. Who are the Rights-Holders?
Most human rights, such as the right to privacy, are individual rights
owed to each person by virtue of his or her status as a human being. The
right to truth, however, is widely considered to be both an individual and a
societal right.' 73 The idea is that both the victims and their family mem-
170. ECOSOC, supra note 137, at para. 24 (quoting Srebrenica Cases, Cases Nos.
CH/01/8365 et al., para. 220(4) (Mar. 2003)). Article 3 of the European Convention for
Human Rights is the prohibition on torture. See European Convention, supra note 15.
171. See DNA law, supra note 7, at para. 4; see also Mayra Pertossi, Argentina Forces
Dirty War Orphans to Provide DNA, ASSOCIATED PREss, Nov. 21, 2009, available at http://
www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=4991.
172. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.1j. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
173. See Lessa, supra note 148, at 6.
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bers hold the right, as does society in search of the truth. 1 7 4 In the Argen-
tine context, the societal right is the right to know the truth of the events
that transpired at the hands of the government. As one scholar writes:
For victims and family, the right entails an obligation for the state to provide
specific information about the circumstances in which the serious violation
of the victim's human rights occurred, as well as the fate of the victim. For
society in general, the right to the truth imposes an obligation on the state to
disclose information about the circumstances and reasons that led to 'mas-
sive or systematic violations,' and to do so by taking appropriate action,
which may include non-judicial measures. 175
Thus, both the individual and the society are the holders of the right
to the truth. 176 This collective right conflicts with the individual privacy
right in the Argentine DNA law, insofar as the law leaves no opt-out provi-
sion for the individual in the event that he or she does not want to provide
a DNA sample. 17 7 This result, however, is in concert with the notion that,
"[b]ecause the individual is a lesser part of the social whole which will
presumably benefit from disclosure, the individual will almost always
lose.' 178 In the instant case, despite the fact that the adult child prefers to
exercise his or her right to privacy, society views disclosure of the truth to
be beneficial to everyone, including the adult child.
The issues and concerns at stake in this situation cannot be mini-
mized; they relate to the fundamental themes of identity and family. The
adult children, who wish to remain anonymous, want to retain their pri-
vacy-they do not want their biological identity investigated. 1 79 Society,
however, wants confirmation of the biological identity in order to establish
the truth and, perhaps, to punish the adult children's parents if they are
found to have knowingly adopted their children illegally. Yet, the adult
child is also a holder of the right to truth, but he or she may not want to
exercise this right affirmatively. The adult child may not want the truth to
be made known.
174. See id.
175. Naqvi, supra note 138, at 260.
176. One may question whether the Abuelas are leveraging a societal right for their
own private interests. That is, does the right to truth actually require biological identifi-
cation? The right, however, is widely seen as encompassing the right to know the fate of
the victim. In this case, the victim is the child who was disappeared or born in detention.
Short of a full admission by the raising parents as to the origins of their illegally adopted
child, biological identification seems to be the only way to determine the fate of this
victim.
177. It can hardly be said that having a court order police to enter one's home to
search for personal items containing DNA is an opt-out provision for the individual who
prefers not to provide a sample.
178. Newman, supra note 89, at 318.
179. There are several reasons why the children of the disappeared might want to
maintain their privacy. In so doing, some may feel as if they are protecting their raising
parents from criminal prosecution. Those who never knew they were adopted may wish
to remain ignorant of this possibility. Also, as in many cases of adopted children in
general, some children of the disappeared may not want their biological families to know
their identity; they view their raising parents as their families and have long-established
ties with them. Turning to their biological families may seem disloyal.
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The parties' desired end result plays a key role in deriving a more opti-
mal solution to the DNA law's one-sidedness. It is important to note that
the Abuelas no longer seek restitution of the child nor return of the stolen
child to his or her biological family. 180 Instead, given the passage of time,
the Abuelas have pushed for restoration of the adult child's identity and
knowledge of his or her origins. 181 The adult children, on the other hand,
simply want, as Justice Brandeis famously wrote, "the right to be left
alone."18 2 They are also, understandably, concerned about having a role-
forced or voluntary-in a trial against the parents who raised them.'
8 3
Regardless of the adult children's biological origins, a DNA test feels to
some of them like betrayal.' 8 4 International human rights law can provide
some insight into this complicated relationship between truth and privacy,
but the final determination of the order of rights lies with the Argentine
government.
B. Does One Right Trump the Other Under International Human Rights
Law?
Despite attempts to argue to the contrary, there is no agreed-upon hier-
archy of human rights.18 5 A brief inspection of several human rights
instruments finds that "human rights," "freedoms," "fundamental human
rights," "fundamental freedoms," "rights and freedoms," and "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" are often used interchangeably.
18 6
Some rights are considered fundamental to human dignity, but there is no
agreement on what makes a right fundamental in nature.1
8 7
The absence of a hierarchy, thus, puts truth and privacy on equal foot-
ing, at least in theory. Upon closer inspection, however, it is possible to
evaluate the legitimacy of the Argentine DNA law. The first step in this
process is to take a closer look at the rights and any permissible limita-
tions included therein. The next step is to examine the practice of states
and their attitudes towards the rights in question.
180. See Oren, supra note 35, at 193-94.
181. See id.
182. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
183. The fact that nearly thirty years have passed since the dictatorship lost power
certainly affects the adult children's idea of who their families are. Interestingly, the
Human Rights Committee in 1980 rejected the communication of a Polish woman who,
after having lived in Canada for seventeen years, requested entry visas for her daughter
and grandson. The Committee noted that, after seventeen years of being apart, "a family
could not be said to have existed," and that "the State was not obligated to re-establish
conditions of family life already impaired by way of positive measures." NowAK, supra
note 129, at 300-01 (citing Human Rights Comm., A.S. v. Canada, Communication No.
68/1980, para. 5.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/, at 27 (1984)); see generally Oren, supra
note 35.
184. See Gashe, supra note 11.
185. See Kristin N. Wuerffel, Discrimination Among Rights? A Nation's Legislating a
Hierarchy of Human Rights in the Context of International Human Rights Customary Law,
33 VAL. U. L. REv. 369, 399 (1998).
186. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. INT'L L.
1, 5 (1986).
187. See Wuerffel, supra note 185, at 397.
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Some scholars argue that the right to truth is nonderogable, 188 but the
issue is far from settled, and no limitations questions have yet arisen. The
right to privacy, as found in Article 17 of the ICCPR, contains no explicit
limitations clause, in contrast to several other rights contained in the con-
vention. Although some scholars or practitioners might try to read limita-
tions into the right to privacy,' 8 9 basic statutory interpretation leads to the
conclusions that this omission was deliberate. As such, like the right to
truth, Article 17 of the ICCPR should be read to lack permissible limita-
tions. Nevertheless, the Argentine DNA law, as written, limits the right to
privacy of the individuals who do not want their DNA tested or genetic
information revealed.
State practice with regard to the rights at issue seems to contradict the
notion that these rights cannot be limited. The right to truth may be too
new to provide a clear view of state practice, but the fact that the Inter-
American Court has heard cases involving the right to truth indicates that
at least some states feel that there are legitimate reasons to withhold truth.
Likewise, state practice with regard to the right to privacy reveals that
states frequently limit privacy: for example in criminal investigations,
heightened airport security, and in schools. Moreover, in a post-9/11
world, states may claim that national security concerns allow them to limit
human rights. 190 Despite the fact that the rights as codified do not contain
limitations, state practice demonstrates the contrary.
It appears that the rights to privacy and truth may have equal stand-
ing, but this conclusion is hardly clear. The international legal authorities
do not address the three-party situation that exists in Argentina between
the grandparents, adult children, and the government. Moreover, treaty
interpretation suggests that privacy rights are particularly protected,
though this protection is difficult to reconcile with state practices limiting
it.
In such a murky situation, perhaps international human rights law
offers more questions than solutions. On the face, it appears that interna-
tional human rights law can help evaluate the DNA law, but there really is
little law directly on point, and state practice is inconclusive at best. It is
important to remember that international law, in any of its forms, is
neither perfect nor comprehensive; not all possible situations are covered
by existing international law. In this circumstance, the Lotus case from the
Permanent Court for International Justice dictates the next step. 19 1 Under
188. See Naqvi, supra note 138, at 265; see also ECOSOC, supra note 137, at 2.
189. See, e.g., Scheinin, supra note 99.
190. See Therese Murphy & Noel Whitty, Is Human Rights Prepared? Risk, Rights and
Public Health Emergencies, 17 MED. L. REV. 219, 234 (2009); see also Penny Andrews,
Sixty Years On: The International Human Rights Movement Today, 24 MD. J. INT'L. L. 47,
50 (2009).
191. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.lj. (set. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). In the Lotus
case, the French ship Lotus collided with the Turkish ship Boz-Kourt in 1926, and, after
aiding the Turkish survivors and transporting them to Constantinople, the officer on
watch at the time of the collision was arrested for manslaughter. The question before the
PCIJ was whether Turkey had violated international law by instituting "criminal pro-
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Lotus, in the absence of a rule of international law prohibiting conduct, the
state may act.' 92 Thus, the issue-in this case the clash of rights implicated
in Argentina's DNA law-should be left to the judgment of the state. The
question then becomes whether Argentina's judgment was sound in this
instance.
C. Does a More Optimal Solution to the Argentine DNA Law Conflict
of Rights Exist?
Even though an analysis of the relevant rights under international
human rights law is unclear, with the result that Argentina may choose
truth over privacy, there may be other solutions that could appease the
interested parties. One possible solution is the imposition of substitute
criminal charges in the event that the raising parents are found to have
acted knowingly and illegally. The other possible solution, and the one I
argue is optimal, is to offer the raising parents amnesty in exchange for the
truth. Both of these situations address the Abuelas' desire for truth and the
adult children's desire for privacy regarding their DNA.
1 93
1. Substitute Charges
Given that there are adult children who prefer not to provide a DNA
sample or have one otherwise taken from them by the police, one must
think of a solution that makes the adult children more likely to agree to a
DNA test when requested by a court. One way to do this would be to ease
the fear that, by providing DNA, the adult children are sending the parents
who raised them to jail. If a DNA test proves that the adult child was not
raised by his biological parents and if the state can prove that the raising
parents knowingly adopted the child illegally, the result may include a jail
term. 194 Bringing substitute charges that do not involve jail time, however,
could relieve some of the burden from the adult children about the conse-
quences of their actions.
Substitute charges mean that the raising parents would be charged,
not with illegal adoption or falsification of registration papers, for example,
but with lesser charges, such as impeding an investigation. 195 Serbia, for
instance, indicted former President of Serbia and Former Republic of Yugo-
slavia, Slobodan Milosevic, on charges of corruption and political assassi-
ceedings in pursuance of Turkish law" against the French officer. Id. at 5. The Court
articulated in dicta what has become known as the Lotus principle: "Restrictions upon
states cannot be presumed," and held that unless France could point to a rule prohibit-
ing Turkey's conduct, there was no violation of international law. Id. at 30-31.
192. See id. at 18.
193. Neither solution fully addresses the adult children's interest in not learning their
biological origins, but both solutions represent improvements over the current law,
which completely disregards the privacy interests of the adult child.
194. See Dirty War Adoption Couple Jailed, BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2008), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/7331857.stm; see also Cry Argentina, Dirty War Babies Jail Foster
Parents, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2005), available at http://www.expressindia.com/news/full
story.php?newsid-4535 7.
195. See Ivan Simonovic, Attitudes and Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes and
Human Rights Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 343, 349 (2004).
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nation, rather than for genocide and war crimes. 196 In the Argentine case,
the use of substitute criminal charges could encourage reluctant adult chil-
dren to come forward and submit to a DNA test at the court's request, as
opposed to being forced to do so by the court's order. The adult children
would be giving up their privacy voluntarily, and at the same time, the
identification of the adult child's biological origins would be revealed,
appeasing the Abuelas' desire for truth.
The problems with substitute charges, however, are twofold. First,
knowing that any charges-even lesser charges-will be imposed may pre-
vent the adult children from complying with a court order requiring DNA
testing. Second, the use of substitute charges risks creating a false histori-
cal record. 19 7 The truth may come out in the media, but the court record
will not accurately reflect the crimes committed by the raising parents.
2. Amnesty for Voluntary Information from Raising Parents
A second option addresses both shortcomings of substitute charges. If
the Abuelas are sincere in their stated goal of restitution of identity and
biological origins, 198 offering amnesty in exchange for information to the
raising parents could result in a workable solution for both the biological
families and the adult children. To be successful, an amnesty-for-informa-
tion initiative would need to require that the raising parents provide a full
accounting of the facts surrounding the adoption. The information pro-
vided would create an accurate historical record and serve the goals of the
Abuelas.
With the burden on the raising parents to provide information, some
adult children whose biological parentage was clarified would, in some
instances, not need to provide DNA, thereby preserving the adult child's
right to privacy. In the event that the raising parents' testimony does not
allow for conclusions about the adult child's biological origins, the adult
child, armed with the information that he or she has a biological family,
might opt to take the DNA test, thereby, providing the Abuelas-and soci-
ety-with information about his or her biological origins.
A similar initiative was put in place in South Africa in 1994, after the
post-apartheid government came to power. 199 The requirements in that
case were that the amnesty-seeker tell everything in his or her knowledge
and show that the crimes were politically motivated.20 0 If Argentina were to
implement such an initiative, as in South Africa, "[a] grant of amnesty
would be the carrot to get perpetrators' cooperation in the process, and the
threat of prosecution would be the stick."'2 0 1
196. See id.
197. By nature of the judicial process, of course, a trial transcript can only provide an
imperfect historical record.
198. See Oren, supra note 35, at 193-94.
199. See HAYNER, supra note 83, at 99.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citation omitted.)
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The dual quest for truth while maintaining privacy does not have to
result in the exclusion of one right in favor of the other. Although the
momentum over the past twenty years has been prosecution-focused, other
options do exist.20 2 Argentina has a legitimate desire to learn the truth
about the children stolen during the dictatorship, just as the adult children
suspected to have been stolen have a legitimate desire for privacy regarding
their biological origins. Exploring options other than criminal trials may
result in a solution that respects both the right to truth and the right to
privacy.
D. Beyond Argentina: A Framework for the Future
By all accounts, the situation in Argentina resulting in the efforts to
identify adults who were illegally adopted as children and whose biological
parents were victims of a regime that disappeared them seems unique. The
reality, unfortunately, is that similar situations will occur in the future, and
countries wrestling with these issues will look to the Argentine experience
for guidance and ideas. A framework to assist countries in deciding the
best avenue to pursue should evaluate several factors: first and foremost,
the age of the person whose identity is in question; second, under what
circumstances the child came to live with the raising family; and third, the
goals and capacity of the country.
As a threshold matter, the age of the individual in question should be
addressed first and be afforded the most weight. A child has a lesser expec-
tation of privacy than an adult, and the methods pursued to identify the
biological origins of an individual should vary depending on the age of
that individual. Where biological information is sought about minors, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child applies, and the best-interest-of-the-
child standard applies.20 3 In these situations, the best interest of the child
may involve compulsory DNA testing and a return to the child's biological
family. The older the child, however, the more difficult it becomes to
remove him from the raising family and to place him in a home with his
biological family, whom he may never have met. As children grow up, their
right to privacy increases as they rely less and less on other adults to make
decisions on their behalf.
Once individuals reach the legal age of maturity, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child ceases to apply, and the adult is afforded the full
right to privacy.20 4 At that point, the adult should have a voice in the
debate about how to proceed in a situation; for example, where prosecutors
want to pursue rape charges against an alleged war criminal and need to
prove a biological relationship between the suspect and the now-adult
child. If that adult is reluctant to undergo DNA testing, then amnesty in
202. See generally HAYNER, supra note 83, at 250-54.
203. CRC, supra note 15, at art. 3 ("In all actions concerning children, whether under-
taken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.").
204. Id. at art. 1.
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exchange for an accounting of the facts or the imposition of other criminal
charges will better satisfy both the biological family's need for truth and
the privacy of the individual in question. 20 5 An adult not under suspicion
of committing a crime should never be forced to undergo compulsory DNA
testing. Such a requirement, which is contained in the Argentine DNA
law,20 6 prevents the adult from exercising her right to privacy at all, and
favors the right to truth to the exclusion of the right to privacy.
Once the age question is addressed, the next step is to examine the
options for countries wishing to identify the biological identity of individu-
als who may have been adopted illegally. DNA testing is certainly one
option, though the imposition of substitute criminal charges, a grant of
amnesty in exchange for an accounting of the facts, or even the establish-
ment of a truth commission are also viable, and perhaps better, mecha-
nisms, depending on whether the political will favors truth or prosecution.
In the case where the raising parents are innocent of any wrongdoing
regarding the manner in which the child came to the family, a truth com-
mission and voluntary DNA testing are the best options. The truth commis-
sion will provide the historical record, and the voluntary DNA testing will
provide the evidence and data should the child want to seek out his or her
biological family. This is the easier case, however; when the raising parents
are suspected of engaging in illegal behavior, the situation is more
complicated.
Assuming that the raising parent (or parents) is suspected of wrongdo-
ing, the focus turns to the goals of the country grappling with these issues.
Where prosecution is the goal, a country will look to DNA testing and the
imposition of substitute criminal charges. If the goal is the establishment of
the truth, however, a country will be better served by an initiative granting
amnesty in return for an accounting of the facts, or a truth commission
with no amnesty component.
In a situation where a country's political will leans toward the prosecu-
tion of suspects, the results of mandatory DNA testing will be an aid in
achieving that goal, while also providing a judicial historical record. 20 7 A
country pursuing this option, however, must make sure that it also has the
capacity to test and to store the DNA securely. If that capacity does not
exist at the national level, resort to international assistance can shore up
the legitimacy of the process. Whether the genetic data is housed as part of
a domestic, hybrid, or international initiative, it will allow a country to
know the biological identity of an individual with the certainty of DNA
evidence.
If mandatory DNA testing is not an option, for whatever reason, a
country pursuing prosecution could impose a combination of substitute
205. This scenario differs from the Argentine situation in that the adult child will
have no reason to protect the rapist, though he may have an interest in protecting his
mother from the often deeply ingrained social prejudice against rape victims.
206. See DNA law, supra note 7.
207. This article assumes that the biological identification is necessary for the
prosecution.
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criminal charges and voluntary DNA testing. The DNA results would assist
prosecutors in making their case, while the substitute criminal charges
would ease the burden that might be felt by the child or adult who is pro-
viding information that could be detrimental to his or her raising parents.
The downside of substitute criminal charges, however, is that the historical
record, at least as provided by the courts, will not reflect the gravity of the
situation. There may also exist a lack of political will on the part of the
population to impose a criminal sanction other than the one called for by
the crime committed. To some countries, however, the simple fact that peo-
ple were found guilty-of something-will be enough to satisfy the desire
for prosecution.
When the goal of the populace leans toward the establishment of truth
more than the establishment of guilt, truth commissions or amnesties in
exchange for facts will better serve this goal than mandatory DNA testing
or substitute criminal charges. Offering amnesty to people who give a full
accounting of the facts allows for the truth to come to light while shielding
the guilty parties from prosecution. It must be remembered, however, that
prosecution remains an option in this situation, should the suspects not
provide the requisite information. In South Africa, for example, if those
seeking amnesty could not prove that their crimes were politically moti-
vated-a requirement for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission-they were subject to criminal prosecution. 20 8
A truth commission, established solely to create a historical record, is
another option for a country seeking to identify the biological origins of
certain individuals. Such a commission gives both the children and the
raising parents an opportunity to come forward, make their voices heard,
and have their stories recorded for history. A truth commission may appear
to be a political compromise not worth accepting, given the seeming lack of
consequences for the guilty parties, but the desire to know the facts may be
strong enough to overcome any mixed emotions about the perpetrators'
fate. in this scenario, the focus is on the children who were taken illegally,
not on the people who took them.
The Argentine situation has relevance beyond its borders, and it can
influence the ways that countries face the need to establish individuals'
biological origins. When a country is focused on prosecution and justice
for the victims, mandatory DNA testing for young children, or the imposi-
tion of substitute charges serves that purpose. A desire for the truth, how-
ever, is better served by granting amnesty in exchange for the facts, or by
establishing a truth commission to listen and establish a historical record.
Conclusion
The Argentine DNA law raises questions regarding the extent to which
a government is willing to pursue its own goals of truth and accountability
at the expense of its citizens' right to privacy. By not leaving an option
208. See generally HAYNER, supra note 83, at 40-45.
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respecting this right if the adult child refuses DNA testing, the law prevents
the individual from exercising the right to privacy at all. The law pits the
rights to truth and privacy against one another, with suboptimal results:
the Abuelas get the information they desire, but their biological grandchil-
dren who wished to retain their privacy are prevented from doing so. At the
same time, the grandchildren unwillingly provide evidence that could put
their raising parents in jail.
An examination of the development of the two rights in question leads
to the conclusion that international human rights law is largely silent on
this clash-of-rights issue and, thus, that it was well within the province of
Argentina to legislate in a way that favored one right-truth-over another
right-privacy. Where international law is silent or inconclusive, the Lotus
principle from the Permanent Court of International Justice provides that
states should be left to their own judgment. Though the outcome of the law
may not be the best way for Argentina to address this piece of its past, the
law is permissible from an international human rights standpoint.
Nonetheless, if what the Abuelas really desire is truth, Argentina
should consider the possibility of offering substitute criminal charges for
families in question whose children voluntarily submit to DNA testing, or
amnesty to the raising parents in exchange for their testimony about the
origins of their family. These two solutions address both the Abuelas' quest
for truth and the adult children's right to privacy, and, thus, maximize sat-
isfaction with the outcome better than the DNA law.
Unfortunately, Argentina is likely not going to be the only country to
have to grapple with these issues. As long as there are situations where
families are separated due to refugee-producing wars, natural disasters, or
government-imposed repression, there exists the possibility of children
being raised by people other than their biological parents, and, thus, the
possibility that the biological origins of these children will need to be
known at some point. When this point arrives, countries in this situation
will look to Argentina, which has been wrestling with transitional justice
issues for nearly thirty years, to examine its approach to this matter. As
such, it is vitally important that, even as Argentina experiments with ways
to address the problem of children who are taken from their disappeared
parents or who are born in clandestine detention centers and then given to
other families, Argentina considers the rights at issue and its place as a
leader in the field of transitional justice.
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